This essay was written prior to the violent events that occurred in Moscow at the beginning of October, when Yeltsin called in such military forces as were available to attack the parliament building (the White House), in which were ensconced his principal opponents under the leadership of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. This was in response to rioting by pro-parliamentary forces, and the death of some sixty persons in a failed attempt by them to take over the Ostankino television station. Yeltsin's coercive victory on this occasion has not sufficiently changed the Russian circumstances for me to alter the analytical conclusions that I present here. In particular, the reader should remember that:

1) The violence taken by Yeltsin against the members of the parliamentary opposition remains local theatre. This constitutional coup applies to Moscow alone, and not to the whole of Russia, still divided into 89 semi-autonomous political units. His demands that the local soviets disband have no teeth.

2) The presentation of a democratic Yeltsin as ousting communist and/or nationalist rebels to rescue the system is a distortion. We have here a situation better described as the big fascist eating the little fascists.

3) Russia was, and is, in constitutional disarray. However, if one has a fetish for the law, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi were as constitutionally correct as Yeltsin, with pedigrees equally democratic. Further, Yeltsin's actions from September 21, decreeing the end of the Supreme Soviet (parliament), the end of the Supreme Court, the banning of a score of publications and organisations, and the end of the local soviets, have no legal foundation at all.

That western political leaders have chosen to throw their largely irrelevant political weight behind Yeltsin is the myopic response of persons whose political imaginations and aspirations cannot understand or accept the collapse of their political raison d'etre, which is the statist presumption of centralism, in the form of either a unitary state or a federation. The possibility of confederation, with Moscow nothing more than a participant in a multiplicity of local organisations, cannot be countenanced by them.

Though argument by historical analogy must ever contain some distortion, details and events never corresponding exactly, one might consider the burning of the Reichstag in Germany in 1933, and its aftermath, as the model being followed by Yeltsin. Hitler destroyed the physical and symbolic stage for opposition to his planned assumption of untrammelled executive authority. Yeltsin is attempting to do the same, following up military repression with arrests, curfews, closure of opposition newspapers, dismantling of the supreme court, and the issuing of decrees to dismantle all local political organisations. As we see in this article, however, it is doubtful that he possesses the resources to extend his powers throughout Russia; and, to the extent that I am correct in this analysis, we should all celebrate.

I

This image was the model promoted by both East and West. Soviet patriotism and American patriotism were equally lauded by their respective political elites. The USSR and the USA had antipathetic systems of economic ownership, but not so antipathetic in their repression of political nonconformity, or repression of those who were thought to commit an unwritten thought crime. The State has become a powerful construct, as could perhaps only and best be seen by an anarchist:

"That formidable mechanism, by which order sent from a certain capital puts in motion all men of a nation, ready for war, and sends them out to carry devastation through countries, and mourning into families; those territories, overspread with a network of officials whose personality is completely effaced by their bureaucratic apprenticeship, and who obey mechanically the orders emanating from a central will

Kropotkin further noted that the new forms of political organisation were associated with a new economic order, generated by what we usually refer to as the industrial revolution:

" that industrial system which crushes under its heels the worker whom the state delivers over to its tender mercies; that commerce which accumulates incredible riches in the hands of those who monopolise the land, the mines, the ways of communication and the riches of Nature, upon which the State is nourished; and finally, that science, which liberates thought and immensely increases the productive powers, but which at the same time aims at subjecting them to the authority of the strongest and to the State all this was non-existent before the Revolution.

It is that image of the State which came to dominate modern consciousness. It is for this reason that we have often been hypnotised by visions of Big Brother as given to us by Orwell's 1984 a dystopia that could be either communist or capitalist or both. The State came to seem capable of consummate control. And politics became the business of capturing power in the State, that the technology of control through coercion and manipulation, both physical and psychological, might be used by the successful party to pursue its policy preferences.

The brazen and rarely questioned power of the State, accepted as the political norm, is the continuing crime of colonialism, of the domination of the developing world by the developed world. The assumption of the controllers of the couple of hundred States that send representatives to the United Nations, is that they can and must use the resources under their control for purposes defined by themselves. That is their perceived and self-fulfilling purpose as holders of positions of power; and to defend that political-statist right, they banded together to support, for example, Pol Pot's bunch of brutal murderers in Cambodia, on the presumption that the State is a normal political condition, and must have its own gangsters in charge.

In this common political logic of the modern world there is a myopic refusal to recognise a political reality; and that is that the modern State is always hanging on by the skin of its teeth. The capacity of the State organisation to be the major player amongst the various organisations that contain and characterise the human experience, is ever in doubt. Even in those States where modern political culture is most effectively developed, in the industrial-technological societies of Europe and North America, the education-propaganda-control process is perpetual. Even in these countries, where the individual citizen's legal status as a person with rights under a rule of law is the (falsely) presumed universal condition, the State must struggle to maintain its viability which condition is one of voluntary identification by the individual with the collectivity. Material inequality, class conflict, regional conflict, linguistic conflict, indifference, and a whole series of other concerns continuously threaten the legitimacy of this political realm. Pluralism, the acceptance of a variety of interlocking groups, beliefs, parties and positions is said to resolve social divisions, within a political framework that allows negotiation and compromise. The problem is that it cannot always work; or, if you like, when it does not work, the State cannot work. The State's brokerage authority is denied, and Northern Irish Catholics, Kurds in Turkey, Serbs in Bosnia, Latvians in the USSR, Quebecois in Canada, Catalans in Spain, etcetera, begin to look for a new political reality. Indeed, it would be hard to find a political system/State in the world today that is not minimally threatened by such a nonconformist sector.

And that brings us to the crisis of the State in the modern era. The State is ever the perceived, potential enemy when it is the instrument of a dominant group to which one does not belong. It is perceived as such in the ghetto in the USA, in a township in South Africa, in a Sikh temple in India, in a Catholic street in Belfast and, apparently, in almost any part of the Russian Federation. In Russia, however, the process has matured to the point where to talk of the Russian State is perhaps a misnomer.

II

1) a culture of obedience;
2) an identifiable source of authority;
3) an esprit de corps and sense of common purpose in the civil service and military;
4) an ability to provide rewards to interlinked elites (political, economic, military, cultural);
5) quasi-governmental organizations (such as parties and organised interests) that coordinate needs and expectations in a manner that hands the arbiter's role to the central State government, including;
6) the capacity to generate perceived national/State interests which can overcome local level sources of conflict (such as differences of religion, language or material welfare).

Together these provide the psychological and organisational cement of any State, and the degree of their presence is an indication of the integrative capacity of the State. In the USSR, the CPSU stood at the centre of all of these integrative mechanisms which, as we have all seen and studied for the past three years, came crashing down.

The general summary concerning the end of the USSR was stated by Mary McAuley as follows: "If 1989 saw the Communist Party lose political authority and its ability to control the media, and 1990 witnessed the War of Laws whereby authority slipped away from any central institution down to the republics, the Property War was just beginning The party apparatus, a major property owner, began to shift its resources at both central and regional levels Individual party officials left the party apparatus and moved into new business ventures with long-term colleagues from the ministries. Meanwhile the shops grew emptier and industrial production declined as supply networks broke down."

"With the [August 1991] coup's failure, the dispersal of control over the remaining resource, coercion, became a reality. The question of republican independence, the end of the Soviet Union, was only a matter of time; the republics could dictate to the centre."

Thus it was; and the first question of those who welcome the demise of this or any other State must be: Will a new, perhaps truncated, federation of States develop around the Russian federation? Or, as others might say: Is a new Russian empire possible through economic integration and/or military conquest?

As I shall indicate shortly, the military capacity of Russia to expand its influence over unwilling subjects is weak at this time. As for a voluntary political re-unionization, it is certain that the leaders of the new States of the former USSR see an advantage in the resumption of trading links with Russia, and Russia will continue to use her leverage (particularly energy supplies) to generate an economic zone to replace the stagnant system, and make it Russo-centric. In July of this year the premiers of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia pledged to move towards economic integration, with free movement of labour. The emerging institutions of the CIS also threaten the recreation of a mega-State. However, more than a loose trading union does not seem to be on the cards at the moment, and that too will have difficulties as each of the former Soviet republics seeks to make its own deals with western corporations, lending agencies and States. In sum, the CIS is going nowhere fast, and the capacity of the Russian State to maintain itself, let alone expand, is what must be seriously questioned.

III

"During the second half of 1989 and the first half of 1990, popularly elected governments representing coalitions of non-Communist forces gained power in nearly all the major cities of the U.S.S.R. and such lesser centers as Chernigov, Volgograd, Sverdlovsk and Iaroslavl. Similar forces took control of whole republics, beginning in the Baltic States and extending them to Georgia, Armenia, Russia, and even the Ukraine. The opening of this vast new field for democratic initiative drained energy and attention of democrats away from the central government."

Communists, seeing the way things were going, jumped on the bandwagon, and abandoned the party for new political realities. It would be better, however, to forget who was or was not a communist in the past. Far more important from an analytical perspective is the continued disintegration of capacities for central control. Indeed, it often seems that Yeltsin's administrative authority only extends to the boundaries of the Moscow region, and that all else is a patchwork of local authorities, each pursuing its own ends. In the words of one commentator:

" real political power in Russia is devolving rapidly. Local networks of ex-communist politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists, regional armed forces commanders, and traders, not forgetting racketeers, have emerged. They pay few taxes, ask more of Moscow than they give, and in some cases deal directly with other countries, selling whatever are the local valuables without reference to Moscow."

An indicator of the inability of Moscow to implement national policies can be seen in a report from the American Embassy in Moscow, dated 26 May 1993. In an attempt to aid American exporters of medical supplies to Russia, it advised that:

"Since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Russia's semi-autonomous regions have taken advantage of the political turmoil in Moscow to seize for themselves various degrees of autonomy. One region has declared full independence, two others have formally declared considerable autonomy, and still others have simply ceased paying the kind of full attention they used to pay to edicts from Moscow. Many are trying to renegotiate their revenue-sharing arrangements with the federal government derived from exports from these regions. These centrifugal forces are strong and gaining

The consequences of these developments are multiple, but one commercial result is the growing procurement independence of regional health care officials."

Health care officials do not usually lead the way in the creation of autonomous political units, and they have not done so in Russia. This is a State system which, if not in a crisis of serious extent, has already ceased to exist.

All of this has taken place in a situation of hopeless institutional confusion. The two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, meeting regularly as a parliament , are faced with the Congress of People's Deputies, meeting every six months and for additional special sessions. Add to this a Constitutional Assembly, brought together at the initiative of the President, with the support of the Congress, to provide a new constitution. Then add a President who has great and imprecise powers to issue decrees, a Cabinet or government responsible to both the President and the Congress, a Security Council appointed by the President and confirmed by the parliament, and a Presidential office, headed by Sergei Filatov, who is often said to be the second most powerful man in Russia after Yeltsin. Then we have a semi-autonomous bureaucratic-ministerial machine, including a central bank that has often refused to take instructions from President or Government, issuing easy credits to an inflation that is out of control. Corruption is rampant at every level, with the term mafia referring to government officials as well as their free market brethren. A federal structure in constitutional law, it is one which is in legislative upheaval concerning the division of powers. Throughout the loose political structure that has been lurching incoherently along, we have 89 (and more) other major units of political division republics, territories, provinces, federal cities, autonomous provinces, and autonomous regions, all disputing the authority of Moscow.

So, when we read about the G-7 States giving grants in aid, and we hear of Boris Yeltsin attending meetings to explain Russia's position on matters of international import, it is all so much air. In Moscow his position has not been constitutionally or operationally precise. He is struggling to maintain his own private position, trying to recapture his role as barricadero, talking to the world from the top of a tank in Moscow '91. He has failed miserably to become the head of a political alliance which would form the basis of a national political party. Instead, operating through the office of the Presidency, choosing allies and making fluctuating alliances in the hope of overcoming opposition from the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, he has sought maintenance of his extensive decree-making powers, and the ability to act autonomously of other institutions and individuals at the heart of the federal political system. He has become the promoter of a Presidential system of government where the chief executive, with substantial autonomy, must answer to the public every four or five years (rather than to an elected assembly on a regular basis). Those in opposition to him (Khasbulatov and Rutskoi perhaps being the most vocal and visible) advocate a parliamentary system, and would have him and his fellow executives controlled and appointed by the legislative body of elected members/congressmen. In July 1993 the Constituent Assembly approved a draft constitution, which is a compromise document between presidential and parliamentary advocates to be fine-tuned by the Supreme Soviet and then made law by the Congress of People's Deputies. However, whatever takes place in Moscow, nothing is guaranteed unless the republican and regional authorities cooperate which is by no means certain.

IV

1) Military fascism would involve a national salvation front, centred on the military, which would install an authoritarian regime in Russia's case, probably with an anti-western, anti-capitalist stance. The promotion of Great Russian nationalism would be part of this, which xenophobia would be encouraged by the so-called Russian diaspora the existence of some 26 million Russians outside of Russia in the States of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Their plight could be used to justify an expanded military role in the Russian State, and even the uninvited interference in the affairs of States of the FSU. We see that in June 1992 the new Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev, and the Russian General Staff, began to examine new directions for military doctrine. Voyennaya mysl' (Military Thought) published a draft Principles of the Military Doctrine of Russia, stating:

"A violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons who identify themselves with Russia ethnically and culturally in former USSR republics can be a serious source of conflicts."

Such views have been reiterated in other military publications as the Russian Armed Forces seek a new place for themselves. Of course, I attribute none of my conclusions to the author of this draft paper. That there is substantial Russian nationalism residual to post-Soviet political culture is evident also from pan-Slavic statements made by political groupings (such as those organised into the Russian Unity bloc) and by the concern expressed in the press for the Russian populations in the war zones such as the Dniester republic, Abkhazia (and the whole ethnic soup which is the Caucasus), and Central Asia. The political players in Moscow have already tried to tap it as when, in September 1992, Yeltsin confirmed the pro-Dniester and anti-Moldovan, Aleksandr Lebed, as commander of the Russian 14th Army in Moldova.

Given the absence of coherence within the Russian State, and the inability of Moscow to control the disobedient regions, this is an attractive ideological vehicle for any centralist seeking to overcome the isolation and ineffectiveness of Moscow's political actors. Perhaps it is also worth mentioning here the revival of Cossack unions and assemblies some of which declare themselves anarchists in the tradition of Makhno.

"It became readily apparent that the Cossack movement was concerned with the reclamation of Cossack lands, establishment of Cossack self-government and protection of Russians who suddenly found themselves living in newly independent republics as `strangers and outsiders'

[D]espite the multiple factions, Cossacks form a powerful political element in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia. They represent a potential organized, coherent polity which can rapidly generate popular support or discontent within their geographic areas. They have recognized leaderships which clearly state their political demands. The hosts also carry a popular appeal to ethnic Russians, who see Cossacks as far more willing to defend their interests than the Russian government."

The author of this statement thinks that the creation of Cossack institutions and the assumption of de facto self government, the lack of any close identity with Moscow, their semi-military gangs reminiscent of the German freikorps after the First World War, and their willingness to arm volunteers to help fellow Russians (or turn into brigands), could all play havoc with Russia's recovery. Indeed, there are a number of reasons to suggest that the Russian military lacks the capacity to intervene vigorously on the political scene. Some of those reasons are:

1) some sections of the armed forces are associated with the regime;
2) there are constant reports of differences within the armed forces;
3) the armed forces are disintegrating, unable to count upon a regular supply of recruits;
4) economic decline has affected military production, creating shortages of equipment; An example of the problems being faced is seen in the decision of the Mikoyan aircraft production complex to discontinue work on the latest MiG fighter. (RFE/RL, 17 August 1993);
5) the circumstances of the failed 1991 coup created a desire in many to distance themselves from politics; and
6) local commanders have a penchant to behave like warlords, if only to sell off State property. Lacking morale, cohesion and resources, the military must be seen as waiting for better days, ready to serve a civilian regime, and hoping that the regime will give it sufficient resources to pursue its domestic and international coercive role. Meanwhile, unable to get recruits, contract soldiers are being hired to solve a manpower shortage 110,000 at this time, with a further 200,000 to be hired before the end of 1994. Yeltsin, hoping to keep their support for his own ends keeps promoting the officers and supporting their demands for men and materials. Thereafter, he hopes that his economic policies will provide the cement for a reunification of Russia under presidential command.

V

This article does not take for its central theme the economic factors that are central to both the problem and any solution to the social and political crises that exist throughout the Russian Federation. However, we should consider briefly the presumption that has held sway in the IMF and in the leaderships of many formerly-communist regimes, that free market capitalism will solve Russia's problems. It is supposed to generate wealth, make people happy, and make the central government strong. For this to happen, economic efficiency must become the watchword, so that profit-making industries might quickly replace the neanderthal system of state ownership and centralised inefficiency and corruption. Simplistic either-or economics seems to have become the characteristic of the last quarter of the twentieth century, probably because the proponents and recipients of neo-liberal economic policies must put faith before analysis. Free market capitalism can survive and expand only if it does two things. It can exist in a society where it provides rewards to workers that are higher than they have been led to expect in recent history (including higher levels of employment and income); and it must have a comparative advantage against the rest of the world an advantage which is used by the State to generate investment at home and sales abroad, within a stable monetary/inflation situation. This does not happen spontaneously, but needs direction and coordination.No matter who coordinates it, it is going to involve unprecedented economic dislocations as state-owned (and subsidised) industries fold, and unemployment goes up to 20 millions in a society where the welfare net was never developed because of presumed full employment, and where savings have ceased to exist because of hyperinflation in excess of 1000% per annum. And the worst is yet to come. Whatever capitalism might hold for Russia, it would not appear to be a factor contributing to political integration at this time. This is recognised by the Statist elite in Moscow, who have placed their hopes in a constitutional renewal.

VI

Further, the tradition of an independent court system does not exist in Russia, and the ongoing conflict between President Yeltsin and the members of the Constitutional Court is part of the political theatre that is the national government of Russia today. That theatre, using July 1993 as an example, included the President depriving members of the Constitutional Court of their bodyguards, as well as the state dacha and official limousine of the chairman, Valerii Zorkin; the President appealing to the Court against a law creating a regiment of guards for the Supreme Soviet; and the parliamentary speaker, Khasbulatov, appealing to the Court against Yeltsin's violation of the rights of Vice-President Rutskoi (who had lost his office, bodyguards, personal doctor, and official duties).

To look to a constitutional solution to Russia's problems, which is also usually seen to involve structures to halt the continuing economic decline, is a vain hope. The centrists of every shade would like to see it in place so as to have a legal-constitutional reference point for possible domination of the regions and the preservation of the State. At this time, however, it is hardly likely to bring about any change at all, unless attitudes can be mobilised on a mass scale through the formation of those implements invented for that purpose: i.e., national political parties. At this time such parties are only in their infancy, as is the case in all regimes which had been ruled by Marxist-Leninist one-party States. In fact, in Russia, we are still at what could be called a pre-party stage of development, with no guarantees that national parties can be developed to fill the space previously held by the communists. Behind these Potemkin Village political constructions are the strutting personalities, none of whom appear to possess either the organisational skills or the popularity-charisma potential to generate mass appeal. Even the April referendum, which Yeltsin and his supporters saw as a popular confirmation of his position and policies, was far from unambiguous in its results. In consequence, for Yeltsin to resolve his problem of gaining efficient power, he might instigate arbitrary personal rule, dispensing with persons and institutions that hinder his will. This we might call civilian fascism.

VII

Fascism, which classically possesses the charismatic authority of a central figure, could be that for which the Leninist regime has prepared the ground. The political logic of the old regime placed the CPSU in a position of doctrinal infallibility, grounded in so-called scientific objectivity, which justified the authoritarian roles of the social and political elite(s). That has gone, and it has left not only a political vacuum, but a distrust of secular ideologies and of the political realm per se. A reunifying saviour figure appealing to the myths of nationalism, race, religion and blood, civilian or military, is not beyond the boundaries of the political situation especially if the economic situation becomes increasingly hopeless, crime increases, security disappears, and expectations fall to zero.

However, fascism may also come creeping into Russia by political default, for democracy is a very unproven mechanism in the contemporary Russian state, and one that is not greatly trusted. For some, political activity is seen to get in the way of economic realism, and we see Yeltsin's press officer, Vyacheslav Kostikov, saying that most republics were very cautious about the April 1993 referendum on the future political character of Russia, concerned that holding the referendum would lead to politicization of society and distract people from economic problems. As ever, any popular participation in politics, even one as minimal as voting in a referendum, is viewed by political elites as threatening to their positions and policies.

Some have even gone so far as to note that Yeltsin is the leader of a democratic minority , and should act in an authoritarian manner for the good of future Russian democracy. This was the position taken by Elena Bonner who argued that:

"The main error of Yeltsin and the true democrats (there are surprisingly few in the executive and especially the legislative branches) was to make an absolute of the idea of democracy as could be seen in the excessive, almost fanatical adherence to democratic institutions and procedures in an undemocratic country, their desire to act only through legal, constitutional methods in a state that is neither constitutional nor based in law, and with a parliament that was elected in a predemocratic period, in another country, and therefore strictly speaking, not legitimate."

It is certainly true that many former communists are operating the new political machinery of a decentralised Russia, remaining the same political class, partly concerned with the perpetuation of their privileges against the hand of economic reform under a renewed Moscow authority. That was certainly the position taken by western leaders when Yeltsin appeared to be designing a coup in March 1993. The USA, for example, promised increased support for Yeltsin (much to the annoyance of Khasbulatov) after he declared his intention to rule by decree. On the other hand, it can be argued that those who put forward the need for a Yeltsin democratic-dictatorship against formerly communist delegates in both Moscow and the provinces saving Russia from both reaction and fragmentation are but one step away from the fascists, seeking the promotion of their policies through a benign dictatorship which would later justify its re-centralised authority through another round of free elections. Undemocratic means are justified by the proper ends, which include a centrally-biased federal Russia. In the last analysis, however, it would depend on the ability of Yeltsin to mobilise mass support, as he did in August 1991. In 1993 he could not do this, and retreated. Political power remains fragmented, sovereignty divided, creating the opportunity for decentralised federalism, sometimes called confederation.

VIII

" society has freed itself, true, but in some ways it behaves worse than when it was in chains. Criminality has grown rapidly, and the familiar sewage that in times of historical reversal always wells up from the nether regions of the collective psyche has overflowed into the mass media, especially the gutter press. But there are other, more serious and dangerous symptoms: hatred among nationalities, suspicion, racism, even signs of Fascism; politicking, an unrestrained, unheeding struggle for purely particular interests, unadulterated ambition, fanaticism of every conceivable kind, new and unprecedented varieties of robbery, the rise of different mafia; and a prevailing lack of tolerance, understanding, taste, moderation, and reason. There is a new attraction to ideologies, too as if Marxism had left behind it a great, disturbing void that had to be filled at any cost."

So, when we see xenophobia, religious fanaticism, racism, or a simple willingness to destroy the other, we should not be surprised. The possible end of the Russian State, and the development of many local authorities could possibly generate a Bosnian conclusion given such cultural predispositions among the population. However, the point we must note is that this is by no means inevitable.

To the degree that the old State structure has substantially collapsed, that a power vacuum exists with the end of communist party control, that governance has become localised, and that capitalism is failing to take root in most of Russia, then anarchists can hope and argue for a broadening of participation in a federation organised from the bottom up in the original phrase of Bakunin. Its advantages are both pragmatic and ethical. It is pragmatic in so far as it reflects the conditions prevalent at this time. It is ethical in so far as it makes possible an expansion of political participation in the smaller political units being generated by disintegration. Perhaps there is here an opportunity for people to take control of their lives back into their own hands, being already rid of many components of the State.

If this is to occur, and for this to occur, the original and simply-interpreted principles of the French Revolution must be applied: liberty, equality, and fraternity. Liberty must exist in the absence of hierarchy and the opportunity (developing greater capacity) of individuals to organise their own lives in free association with others. Equality must be understood as material as well as moral equality in the form of socialist, common property, and equal personal property. Fraternity must exist as the cultural acceptance of all as being of equal value, as ends in themselves, and the pursuit of that by everyone again, referring to Bakunin, we can remember his adage that he could not regard himself as free as long as there is one unfree person in the world. Face to face self-governance in voluntary association with others is what is most likely to generate such a culture of mutual respect. Hierarchies grounded in ideology, property, the State, or any other aspect of our specific situation, might then disappear. That would be Anarchy.

The end of European communism was not the end of history in the sense that the world would come to accept the liberal values and the liberal State, Francis Fukuyama notwithstanding. What it does indicate is the need to develop another kind of political imagination, grounded in the character of the disintegrated State as it has emerged today. As we have seen, the liberal and capitalist option is a debacle. As I have tried to show here, in spite of other options, there is a strong chance that, for the immediate future, we will be looking at a multiplicity of centres of political power. Some of those local systems are appallingly narrow in their policies and purpose. However, the Russian population at the grassroots, in both town and country, has now the opportunity to influence their communities in an unprecedented way; and the way in which they do influence their communities, opposing Moscow whilst taking power from their self-selected local elites, will be one indication of the possibility of alternatives to the depersonalised and dehumanised face of politics as it has developed in the modern State. Or, if you like, it could be an indication of the possibility of a renewal of the anarchist option, understood in the classic Proudhonian sense as order without authority.